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Abstract
This paper presents a synthesized model of asymmetric information. An empirical analysis of more
than 1,400 NYSE common stocks shows that trade direction is more important than volume in re-
vealing the asymmetry. There is also evidence to suggest that signed duration reflects informed
trading activity. We use the proposed measure of information asymmetry to study daily changes in
the level of informed trading and find that earnings announcements narrow the information gap
between the informed and the uninformed. On average, information asymmetry is largest at the
beginning of the trading day and it decreases monotonically toward the closing bell. More impor-
tantly, the asymmetric information measure is negatively related to the number of shareholders,
number of analysts following a firm and whether there is an exchange-traded equity option written
on the firm’s stock. An implication of this finding is that firms can reduce information asymmetry
by implementing disclosure measures that attract not only more investors and analysts but also
option writers.
Keywords: Market Microstructure, Information Asymmetry
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The information structure of a firm is determined largely by the information channels through
which the state of the firm is revealed to the world. For listed firms, the primary channel is the stock
market. Through the stock market, traders convey and exchange information. Better informed
traders convey more information, and stand a better chance of making a profit in the market. Before
the release of material information, those who know it and transact ahead of public disclosure are
privately informed traders. Investors who do not know the private information is referred to as
uninformed traders. In particular, market makers are also uninformed and they trade in a way that
minimizes their losses to insiders. Copeland and Galai (1983), Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) and many others draw a crisp line between those who have private information and those
who do not.
This definition is somewhat narrow and inadequate for two reasons. Firstly, trading on mate-
rial information before public announcement is illegal in many countries and certainly in the U.S.
where insider trading laws are enforced. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable
to believe that most insiders are law-abiding with respect to these laws. Nonetheless, Easley, Hvid-
kjaer, and O’Hara (2002) find that the probability of informed trading (PIN) is 19.1% on average
for NYSE-listed firms. Namely, in 19 out of 100 trading days, informed investors are trading with
private information. If informed traders were all insiders, it would appear that despite the laws,
insider trading is quite rampant and unchecked in the U.S. market. It would also imply that law
enforcement agencies such as the SEC were not doing enough to curtail illegal insider trading.
Secondly, in markets populated by professional dealers only, adverse selection costs are still sig-
nificant. An example is the inter-dealer Treasury market analyzed by Green (2004). Intriguingly,
Green finds that the level of information asymmetry as measured by a modified model of Madha-
van, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) increases after the scheduled release of macroeconomic data.
How could information asymmetry prevail among these professional traders with regard to public
information?
Of course, one can turn the empirical evidence around to suggest that the structural PIN model
and the measure used by Green are misspecified. As a matter of fact, all empirical analyses can
only infer the existence of asymmetric information from the data, as these data do not provide any
indicator as to which orders and trades are motivated by private information. It could well be that
the models are prone to infer that there is information asymmetry even when privately informed
traders are not trading. Several papers document evidence that casts doubts on existing economet-
ric models of information asymmetry. For example, Neal and Wheatley (1998) conclude that the
adverse selection components of closed-end funds are larger than expected. They suspect that some
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of the popular models of asymmetric information might be misspecified. Van Ness, Van Ness, and
Warr (2001) also ascertain that existing measures of adverse selection costs relate inconsistently to
the corporate finance proxies for the information structure of a firm.
Finally, the econometric models themselves appear to be in conflict with each other. For example,
in the basic model proposed by Glosten and Harris (1988), the carrier of asymmetric information
is the signed volume, whereas Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans
(1997) argue that it is the trade sign that is asymmetrically informative. When the econometric
models disagree on the variables that reflect adverse selection, conflicting interpretations of empir-
ical results are inevitable.
This paper recognizes that a broader framework is needed to clarify the notion of informed
trading. We categorize market players into three groups according to their ability in acquiring
and digesting information speedily. Whenever there is some sort of a divide that differentiates
traders, there will be information asymmetry. Private signal is not the only source. As in Green
(2004), different interpretation of the same public information could lead to information asymmetry
among dealers of U.S. Treasury securities. This broader framework is useful for reconciling some
of the conflicting findings in the literature.
Instead of rescinding the existing models, we take a constructive approach by first acknowledg-
ing that the customary definition of informed trading is inadequate. This paper suggests that one
can better understand the empirical results documented in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002)
and Green (2004) when a broader framework of informed trading is employed. Within this broader
framework, this paper offers a synthesized model to resolve the conflicts. Instead of treating the
variables as mutually exclusive, a natural approach is to take both signed volume and trade sign as
explanatory variables. It is noteworthy that using one without the other will lead to over-loading
on the single variable and thus result in biased parameter estimates. Therefore, it may well be
that the adverse selection costs estimated in the literature are biased because some relevant vari-
ables are not included. This could potentially explain why Neal and Wheatley (1998) and Van Ness,
Van Ness, and Warr (2001) find the estimates inconsistent with other proxies for information asym-
metry.
The main thrust of this paper is to provide evidence that the information structure of a firm
relates consistently to a novel measure that emerges from the joint estimation. Specifically, we find
that analysts and equity option markets play a significant role in reducing the level of information
asymmetry in the stock market. Since information asymmetry is related to the cost of capital, our
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findings indicate that it is sensible for firms to implement disclosure policies that attract not only
more traders and analysts but also option writers.
In addition to trade sign and signed volume, we include trade-to-trade duration and a signed
version of this duration in our specification. The inclusion of these variables is motivated by Glosten
and Milgrom (1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O’Hara (1992). In their the-
ories, the time interval between consecutive trades and the associated trade sign in response to
either good or bad news contain information as well. Our findings indicate that signed duration
also captures asymmetric information.
The proposed asymmetric information measure is consistent with two standard features of fi-
nancial markets. The measure registers higher values for trades executed during NYSE’s opening
hours and lower values in the late afternoon. More importantly, the measure can quantify daily
level of informed trading and thus is useful in studying changes in the level surrounding a sched-
uled information event. We find that the level of asymmetric information changes after firms re-
lease their quarterly earnings. The level is slightly higher before the announcement. It decreases
monotonically until one to two days after the news release. This decline is observed regardless of
whether earnings surprises or meets analysts’ expectation. For negative surprises in particular,
the decline in the level of information asymmetry is more pronounced.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the information structure of a
firm and clarifies the notion of informed trading. A natural measure of information asymmetry
is proposed. Data used in our empirical study are described in Section II. Section III reports the
empirical findings based on daily parameter estimates. Section IV documents the relations of our
measure of informed trading with variables that are used as proxies for the information channels
of a firm. In Section V, we summarize the findings and conclude the paper.
I. Informed Traders and Models of Informed Trading
A variety of material information is generated by firms’ managers, financial service providers and
government agencies. In the event of delisting or takeover, the terminal value of a firm is material
information. Quarterly financial results and forward guidance, major contracts, changes in div-
idend payout, capital reductions, private placements, stock splits and so on are important news,
especially when the element of surprise is substantial. In addition, index reconstitutions as well as
some macroeconomic numbers are also monitored by traders.
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With regard to these news, which do not occur everyday for a given stock, this section attempts
a classification of traders to fine-tune the terms “informed” and “uninformed” used in the literature.
Finally, we propose a synthesized model to measure the extent of informed trading.
A. Who are Informed and Who are Uninformed?
In Harris (2003), a trader is said to be informed if she can arrive at reliable conclusions about
whether financial instruments are fundamentally overvalued or undervalued. Informed traders
understand intrinsic values better than other traders because they have better access to fundamen-
tal data and can better analyze the implications from their data. To make this notion of relatively
informed and relatively uninformed trading operational, we consider three types of traders.
Obviously, company insiders are the most informed. Since their transactions are regulated un-
der the insider trading laws, they are deterred from trading on material information. Of course,
unscrupulous insiders can tip others and trade through proxies. In addition, espionage on material
information by company employees, associates or outsiders as well as inadvertent leakage prior to
public announcements can happen. For convenience, this category of informed traders are referred
to as insiders, which includes connected persons and people who obtain pre-release material infor-
mation. Officers of government agencies who prepare and report key macroeconomic statistics that
have bearing on the financial markets are also insiders. Similarly, executives responsible for index
reconstitutions are in this category as well. The signal they receive is most precise. A common
feature of this group of traders is that they possess private information before it is made public.
The second type of relatively informed traders is institutional investors. These traders know
that their trading activity can move prices. They also know that their analysts’ forecasts, ratings
and recommendations are influential. Therefore, even in the absence of firm-specific information,
their discretionary portfolio rebalancings affect market prices. Typically, they have access to in-
formation systems and news feeds that allow them to gain a better understanding of not only the
firms but also the macroeconomic conditions and real-time trades and quotes. Included in this cate-
gory are designated market makers with inventories. They too attempt to obtain information from
news and reports to form reliable valuation of the companies they specialize in. If institutional
traders and market makers were not diligent in information gathering to gain deeper insights on
the firms and the overall market, they would incur losses and go out of business. These traders
are constantly on the look out for insiders’ private information in the order flows. In fact, Anand
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and Subrahmanyam (2005) find that market intermediaries are informed traders as their trades
account for a majority of price discovery in spite of trading less than their clients.
The third type of relatively informed traders are small and retail investors. They are mindful
that their trades will not move prices. Nevertheless, they too strive to obtain public announcements
of firm-specific information as soon as they are released. More importantly, they also monitor the
trades and quotes closely to make real-time trading decisions. Skillful day traders who trade for
a living fall under this category. In addition, managers of small funds whose trades are not large
enough to create an impact are also considered as small traders. They become informed by reading
charts, company and analysts’ reports, investment magazines as well as newspapers.
Almost surely, every trader will examine past and prevailing prices before they submit an order.
Every market participant is informed to a certain extent. But, the lack of sufficient resources
and real-time analytical expertise makes a difference. Retail investors who cannot devote full
time to monitor market pulses are uninformed traders most of the time. They do not understand
fundamental values better than other traders because even if they have access to fundamental data,
they cannot decipher the implications reliably. Their trades are noise because their opinions do not
constitute a reliable valuation of the securities and market conditions. On the contrary, if retail
and small investors spend time and effort to form reliable opinions about the value and the price
trend, they will become less uninformed. Conversely, institutional investors may at times make
investment mistakes so that their trades are effectively no different from noise. In other words,
every trader except the insider can become a noise trader.
We stress that institutional traders including the market makers have vested interests to know
the fundamental values and the market conditions. They trade strategically for liquidity and profit.
Small and retail investors are as motivated to stay informed but they do not have the economy-of-
scale advantage of institutional traders.
More importantly, even when insiders abstain from trading, information asymmetry still exists
in the other two categories of traders. The main reason is that these outsiders have different
capabilities and speed to acquire and process public information. Obviously, traders who trade for
a living will expend greater effort learning whether a signal (announcement) has occurred. If it
does occur, they will analyze it to determine whether it is a good or bad signal before the trading
session. Uninformed traders, in contrast, are not able to form a correct interpretation of the signal
even if they know that the signal exists.
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Therefore, it is plausible that the ability to create order imbalance brings about a dichotomy
between the informed and the uninformed. The results in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002)
may be interpreted consistently under this broader framework of informed trading. The average
value of about 19% of informed trading found by the PIN model may be reflecting the information
asymmetry primarily among the institutional traders, small and retail investors, and not so much
whether some of them have insider information. The higher-than-expected adverse selection costs
in Neal and Wheatley (1998) may also be attributable to traders’ different abilities in evaluating
closed-end funds’ premiums or discounts. Changes in the dividend payout and stock splits may also
cause traders to interpret the signals emitted by closed-end funds differently.
Transactions themselves are also informative in reflecting the forces of supply and demand. In
our framework, market makers are informed on the net demand of buy and sell, which helps them
to set the quotes accordingly. Indeed, Green (2004) suggests that primary dealers of Treasury bonds
have different interpretations of newly released macroeconomic statistics. They also have different
order flows from their clients. Together, these differences give rise to information asymmetry among
these dealers.
An implication of transactions as indirect news is that information asymmetry should be higher
at the beginning of the trading day and lower toward the end of the trading day. Most U.S. firms
announce price-sensitive information in the evening or before the opening bell. Institutional and
small investors are presumably more capable in digesting new information speedily and effectively.
Their re-evaluation of the firm is manifested in transactions, especially during the opening hours
of the trading day. As more information is incorporated through transactions, initially uninformed
traders and market makers become more informed3 on the implications. Therefore, the level of
information asymmetry should be higher at the beginning of the trading day and it declines as
trading approaches the closing hour.
B. Economic Theories of Informed Trading
In the context of this broader interpretation of relatively informed versus relatively uninformed
traders, we turn to the discussion of several market microstructure theories. The motivation is to
identify variables that reflect informed trading. Most theories pitch the informed traders against
3Learning from transactions is a shared feature of many notable theories of market microstructure. Examples are
Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990).
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the uninformed market makers4. For example, in the sequential framework of Glosten andMilgrom
(1985), informed traders maximize the profit by trading as often as possible. An implication is that
signed duration reveals information asymmetry. Their trading direction will affect the price when
it is still not at the full-information level. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) further argue that the order
size can be normalized to one. Thus, trade sign rather than volume is asymmetrically informative.
This proposition is contrary to the model in Kyle (1985). Under the batch auction trading, the
monopolist market maker strives to infer whether some of the orders are submitted by an insider5
prior to setting a price. The linear equilibrium solution of the Kyle model suggests that signed
volume is informative in determining the transaction price. He and Wang (1995) smoothen the
sharp dichotomy between insiders and outsiders with the notion of differential information. In
their framework, information includes not only new private signals but also public announcements
and market prices. Even the private information is differential. Each informed trader has some
information that others do not know. An implication of their theory is that signed volume reflects
information asymmetry.
Easley and O’Hara (1987) develop a structural model with the market makers and the unin-
formed traders not knowing whether an information event has occurred. In their theory, the signal
is assumed to occur before the trading day begins. Only the informed traders observe the signal.
The equilibrium structure of the Easley-O’Hara (1987) model is more complicated, but the implica-
tion is quite the same as the previous two theoretical models. Both trade size and trade direction
reveal asymmetric information.
Economic considerations in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and
Easley and O’Hara (1992) suggest that durations are indicative of informed trading. In particular,
when even the existence of information event is uncertain, Easley and O’Hara (1992) demonstrate
that the lack of trade provides a signal to market participants that there is no information. It
follows that the time between trades contains at least this piece of information and thus no longer
exogenous to the efficient price process. Longer duration between consecutive trades is associated
4The “uninformed market makers” in most microstructure theories are mainly the uninformed limit-order traders.
The designated market makers intermediate as brokers. On the NYSE, for example, specialists’ participation rate
is about 11.4% on average between year 1973 to 2003 with a standard deviation of 1.8% (See NYSE Fact Book). As
discussed earlier, some traders are uninformed relative to other informed traders not because the latter necessarily have
insider information but because they are able to arrive at reliable conclusions about the stock valuation more quickly
and more accurately.
5Kyle remarked that the term “insider trading” used in Kyle (1985) was unfortunate during a seminar at the 12th
Conference on the Theories and Practices of Securities and Financial Markets held at Kaohsiung, Taiwan.
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with a lower level of informed trading6. This result is the opposite of the theoretical prediction by
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). Long duration signals bad news because informed traders cannot
sell short7.
Whichever the case, the trade that occurs after a long duration may signal that news has ar-
rived. If it is good news, then buyer-initiated trades are more likely to occur, and vice versa. There-
fore, not only is the duration but also the direction of that trade, which reflects the news direction
(good or bad), is also important. It is plausible that signed duration provides a different dimension
to examine the information content of a trade that occurs after a long duration. Indeed, Dufour and
Engle (2000) empirically demonstrate that signed durations do affect price updates.
As a summary, these theories suggest that at least trade direction, signed volume and signed
duration are variables that reflect asymmetric information. This paper makes a hypothesis that
relatively uninformed traders learn from these pieces of information from transactions earlier in
the trading day and become relatively less uninformed. Consequently, the asymmetric information
gap between the initially informed traders and the uninformed traders becomes narrower. It follows
that the level of information asymmetry should become lower toward the later part of the regular
trading hours.
C. Empirical Specification
Most empirical models of adverse selection costs, such as Glosten-Harris (1988), Huang-Stoll (1997)
and Madhaven-Richardson-Roomans (1997), are motivated by these microstructure theories. For
ease of exposition, these three empirical models are henceforth referred to as the GHmodel, the HS
model and theMRRmodel, respectively. They start from Roll (1984)’s formulation of the transaction
price:
Pi = Mi + C Qi . (1)
In words, the transaction price Pi of i-th trade is postulated to equal the sum of the unobservable
efficient price Mi and the transitory transaction cost C. The trade sign Qi is one or minus one for
buyer- or seller-initiated transactions, respectively.
6Note that Easley and O’Hara (1992) do not predict the reverse case that short duration is necessarily associated with
a higher level of information asymmetry.
7Note that Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) do not suggest that short duration is necessarily good news.
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By definition, the unobservable efficient price is a random walk given by
Mi = Mi−1 + ui . (2)
Since ui affects the efficient price directly, it contains information impounded by the i-th trade. Note
that all the earlier information from the (i− 1)-th trade and recursively the (i− 2)-th trade and so
on is already incorporated in Mi−1. For example, lagged trade sign Qi−1 and signed volume Xi−1
are already in the previous efficient priceMi−1.
Depending on the assumptions made for the random component ui, these three models are
obtainable from equation (1) as variants of the following canonical form:
∆Pi = C∆Qi + ui , (3)
where ∆ is the first-order difference operator. To make empirical estimation possible, all the three
models rely on this equation with different postulates for ui.
If one regards equation (3) as the main econometric specification, then it boils down to identi-
fying the relevant explanatory variables for ui. In the GH model, signed volume Xi is the carrier
of information asymmetry. By contrast, trade sign Qi is the variable that reveals informed trading
in the HS and the MRR models. To avoid misspecification, it is natural to admit both trade sign Qi
and signed volume Xi as explanatory variables rather than favoring one over the other. Therefore,
we postulate that the innovation ui of efficient price in equation (2) is
ui = b1Qi + b2Xi + b3Qi∆Ti + b4∆Ti + i . (4)
We also examine whether inter-trade duration8 ∆Ti and signed duration Qi∆Ti reflect informed
trading. As discussed earlier, these two variables are motivated by economic theories that em-
phasize the information role of time interval between consecutive trades. The residual i is the
innovation in market participants’ beliefs due to new information not captured by the i-th trade.
With the innovation ui specified as in equation (4), we obtain from equation (3) the following
specification to explain intra-day stock price change:
∆Pi = C∆Qi + b1Qi + b2Xi + b3Qi∆Ti + b4∆Ti + i . (5)
8The duration ∆Ti is a relevant variable as it captures the drift in the efficient priceMi. In this context, b4 is the drift
rate of the efficient price process.
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This econometric model follows the traditional path pioneered by the GH, HS andMRRmodels. The
inclusion of duration and signed duration extends these three models to capture information asym-
metry that is revealed in trade frequency. The first term C∆Qi reflects the transitory component,
whereas the remaining four terms jointly explain a portion of the price change that is motivated by
informed trading.
From the perspective of equation (5), the three models discussed earlier have the problem of
omitted variables. In the HS and the MRR models, the signed volumes Xi as well as the duration
∆Ti and signed duration Qi∆Ti are omitted. For the GH model, the same problem occurs. From
the standpoint of econometrics, when all the relevant variables are not specified, the parameter
estimates are likely to be biased.
On the other hand, one may suspect that some variables in equation (5) are irrelevant. However,
in this case, there is no bias in the parameter estimates even if some variables are irrelevant. The
drawback, however, is that the estimators for the parameters are inefficient. Nonetheless, the
estimator σ̂2 for the variance of the residual i is unbiased. This property is crucial in ensuring that
the R2 of equation (5) is also unbiased, since it is a linear function of σ̂2 (see Maddala (1977) and
Maddala (2001)).
Equation (5) also allows us to investigate which of the variables have more explanatory power
from their Newey and West (1987) t-statistics. This test is useful in ascertaining whether, for
example, trade size is more important than trade sign in capturing asymmetric information.
If the stock price change is purely frictional and void of information, the innovation ui of equa-
tion (3), which is nested in equation (5), will be pure noise. Namely, ui and i of equation (5) do
not yield statistically different residual sum of squares in this circumstance. Their respective R2
values, denoted as R2c for equation (3) and R2all for equation (5), will not be much different as a
result. Conversely, when the four variables of ui capture the price impact of a trade, then R2all will
be larger than R2c .
To quantify the joint explanatory power contributed by Qi, Xi, Qi∆Ti and ∆Ti in equation (5),
we consider the following relation:
1−R2all = (1−R2asy)(1−R2c) , (6)
where R2asy is the additional goodness of fit contributed jointly by the four variables predicated to
reflect informed trading. This equation is basically an identity of linear regression rather than
10
an empirical relation. As equation (3) is nested in equation (5), the unexplained portion 1 − R2c
in equation (3) will be reduced by a factor given by 1 − R2asy when four variables are added. The
product of these two quantities equals 1−R2all. This argument is adapted from Maddala (2001).
Instead of using the estimates for b1, b2, b3 or b4 as (absolute) adverse selection costs, one could
use R2asy to quantify information asymmetry9. This measure summarizes the explanatory power
jointly contributed by the four variables. The motivation for this asymmetric information measure
is twofold. First, if we use only, for example, the coefficient b1 of the trade sign to estimate adverse
selection costs, then the asymmetric information components captured by b2, b3 and b4 are not
accounted for. On the other hand, one cannot simply add these components together because each
reflects a different dimension of information asymmetry. Moreover, b1 is in dollars, b2 in dollars
per share, b3 and b4 are in dollars per unit time. The measure of informed trading R2asyhas the
added advantage that its value is between zero and unity, which makes it possible to interpret it
as the proportion of price change that is motivated by informed trading. By using R2asy , this paper
resolves the conflict between models that depend onQi only and models that useXi only to quantify
adverse selection costs. We henceforth refer to R2asy as asymmetric information measure, or AIM in
short.
Second, AIM is complementary to PIN and a relative measure proposed in Hasbrouck (1991a).
Structural PIN model is estimated with the daily numbers of buys and sells. Nonetheless, price-
sensitive information encoded in volume and duration is not incorporated in the PIN model. Also,
one has to assume that the parameters needed to construct PIN remain constant over the sam-
ple period of, say, 60 trading days or more. Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b) measure
asymmetric information in trade innovation with vector auto-regression (VAR) methodology. This
is different from our framework based on Roll (1984)’s definition, which is expressed as equation (1).
The VAR approach has the advantage that the estimation is robust to the specification of transi-
tory component. But, there is no ground to dispute the sensibility of Roll’s definition either, which
is widely known to reflect the transitory bid-ask bounce. From the practical standpoint, the data
requirement is less demanding with the AIM approach than the VAR approach. This is especially
true for less liquid stocks, as they may not have sufficient observations to make VAR estimation
feasible on a daily basis. The estimates obtained from VAR may also be sensitive to the number
of lags. In some sense, AIM may be considered as an asymmetric information measure that is be-
9The procedures to obtain R2asy are simple. Two separate OLS regressions based on equations (3) and (5) are per-
formed with y intercepts included in the specifications. Using the two coefficients of determination R2c and R2all, R
2asy is
obtained from equation (6).
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twixt and between the structural economic (such as PIN) and the reduced-form (such as Hasbrouck
(1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b)) models10.
II. Data
The sample period of our study is from January 2, 2003 through December 31, 2003, a total of 252
trading days. The reason for choosing year 2003 is that data such as the number of shareholders
needed in our analysis are not as widely obtainable for earlier years. Another reason is the need
to control for microstructure noise generated by price discreteness. After February 2001, the effect
of price discreteness should be considerably smaller compared to the pre-decimal tick-size regimes.
Moreover, by 2003, traders should have become accustomed to trading with the minimum tick size
of one cent.
From CRSP database, a sample of NYSE common stocks is taken. Firms with negative stock
prices or market capitalizations are excluded. For firms with more than one class of security, we use
TAQ’s master file to cross-examine and choose the one that is representative of the firm according
to the CUSIP as well as the security’s name. With all these filters, the final sample size is 1,461
stocks. Panel A of Table I reports the descriptive statistics for these NYSE common stocks.
Intra-day trades and quotes are obtained from TAQ. We sign the trades based on the “tick
test.”11 In the same panel, we tabulate the descriptive statistics for the trading activity. Seller-
initiated transactions are indicated with negative statistics. Annual data for the number of share-
holders and book values are extracted from Compustat. The number of analysts following a firm is
derived from I/B/E/S. Panel A of Table I also provides the descriptive statistics for these data. In
Panel B, we report the correlation coefficients. As expected, market capitalization correlates posi-
tively with both shareholders and analysts but negatively with book-to-market ratio. We also find
10We thank Hasbrouck for this point of view on the synthesized model vis-a`-vis the existing models.
11Lee and Ready (1991) examine the accuracy of tick test and find that it provides accurate directional inferences for
NYSE stocks. To improve the accuracy, they propose an algorithm to sign trades. Their method requires the identification
of prevailing quotes. Since quotes are reported with an unknown time lag, they recommend adding five seconds to the
quotes’ time stamps to synchronize the clocks used in recording the trade and quote tapes. Since Lee and Ready (1991),
the NYSE’s reporting systems have changed and the frequency of quote updates has increased dramatically. How the
quotes lag the trades in year 2003 is by no means obvious. The time lag may be different from one stock to the other.
To complicate matter, it is not unusual to observe many quotes with the same time stamp at the one-second resolution.
Furthermore, multiple trades can and do occur within the same second. The problem of multiple-to-multiple mapping
is quite intractable in the course of our attempt to apply the Lee-Ready algorithm. For these reasons, and also because
some quote files are not available for some of our sample stocks on some days, we resort to using the tick test to sign the
trades.
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that the book-to-market ratio relates negatively with the number of analysts but insignificantly
with shareholders. As anticipated, the latter two numbers correlate positively.
Finally, information regarding whether a firm has exchange-traded equity options is obtained
from the Options Clearing Corporation.
III. Estimations and Analysis
For each trading day and each stock, we perform an OLS regression with equation (3), and a GMM
regression based on equation (5). The asymmetric information measure R2asy is obtained from equa-
tion (6). In total, there are 329,187 stock-days in our sample. We plot the time series of daily
cross-sectional average AIM values in Figure 1. It is evident that average AIM fluctuates from one
trading day to the other.
On May 19, 2003 in particular, estimated AIM is at its peak with a value of 27.79%. After
the Group of Seven finance ministers’ meeting in France over the weekend, Treasury Secretary
John Snow indicated that Washington supported a weaker dollar. On that Monday12, however, the
White House clarified that there had been no change in its policy supporting a strong dollar. These
announcements probably create a larger wedge between the informed and the uninformed, thus a
larger value of AIM.
Next, the distribution of these 329,187 AIM values is plotted in Panel A of Figure 2. On average,
this measure of informed trading is 19.7% with a standard deviation of 9.2%. In other words, after
controlling for transitory component C, the last four explanatory variables in equation (5) jointly
explain about 20% of the variation in the high-frequency price change. It follows that about 20% of
the trades in our sample of NYSE firms are associated with informed trading.
Panel B displays the histogram of the annual average AIM values for our 1,461 sample stocks.
The cross-sectional average value over the sample period is 20.5% for these stocks. This average
value is large if information asymmetry is caused only by insiders who trade illegally ahead of
public disclosures. In other words, if 20% of the trades contained purely insider information, then
it would imply that U.S. insider trading laws fail to be a deterrent and their enforcement is inef-
fective. But, if one uses the broader framework discussed in Section I.A, where some traders are
12Themarket closed out the day with steep losses. The Dow Jones Industrial Average Index declined 185.58 to 8,493.39.
The S&P 500 Index dropped 23.53 to 920.77, while the Nasdaq Composite Index plummeted 45.76 to 1,492.77. The yield
of 10-year Treasury note also declined 8/32, yielding 3.45%.
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better informed by virtue of their superior ability in pricing the fair value of a stock as well as in
understanding the prevailing market conditions, then this percentage of information asymmetry
appears to be a reasonable estimate.
A. Relative Importance of Explanatory Variables
To examine the relative importance of informed trading variables, we count the numbers of statis-
tically significant coefficients in equation (5). The results are reported in Table II. We find that
b1, the coefficient of trade sign Qi, is the main contributor. At the two-tail 5% and 1% levels, b1
is, respectively, 92.65% and 87.33% of the times significant. Therefore, the HS or the MRR model
accounts for a larger portion of the variation in the non-transitory price change.
Results also show that signed volume Xi and signed duration Qi∆Ti are the next two most
important explanatory variables. While the role of Xi has been well studied, it appears that the
importance of signed duration has been overlooked in the literature on adverse selection costs. The
coefficient of the duration∆Ti, however, is significant only 5.77% of the times at the 1% level. This is
three times lower than signed duration’s 19.25%. There is therefore some evidence to suggest that
it is not the duration per se but the signed duration that captures informed trading. As a robustness
check, intra-day observations are pooled over a month. Same regressions are performed, but the
results do not change the conclusions.
As shown in Panel C of Table II, among the parameter estimates significant at the 1% level, more
than 93% of b1, b2 and b3 are positive. The positivity of these parameter estimates for the trade sign,
the signed volume and the signed duration, respectively, lends support for their roles in revealing
asymmetric information. In particular, positive loading on the signed duration is consistent with
the notion that after a long duration, a trade has more impact in moving the stock price in the
direction of its trade sign. For example, a buy 100 seconds later has more price impact than a buy
with a duration of 1 second.
B. Is Trade Sign Alone Sufficient to Reflect Information Asymmetry?
With Qi found to be the most important carrier of informed trading, we examine whether the other
three variables are redundant. Therefore we consider
∆Pi = C∗∆Qi + b∗1Qi + 
∗
i . (7)
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In addition to comparing b∗1 with b1 from the synthesized model (equation (5)) directly, the two ratios
defined as
r∗ ≡ b
∗
1
C∗ + b∗1
; r ≡ b1
C + b1
(8)
are also compared. We estimate the parameters daily using intra-day data for each stock.
To ascertain whether there is a bias in b∗1 due to variable omission, we examine a subsample of
1,409 stocks that have more than 10 days of daily estimates. For each stock, a t-test is performed
to compare the daily b∗1 and b1 estimates on the null hypothesis of equal mean. Table III reports the
results by market capitalization quintile. For every quintile, the first to 99-th percentile statistics
for b∗1, b and the t-statistics are tabulated in Panel A. We find that estimated b∗1 and b values are
larger for smaller capitalization stocks, as anticipated. Within each quintile, we observe that b∗1 is
larger than b for all the percentile values.
Even at the first percentile, the two-tail t-statistic of the two-population mean test in each
quintile is already above 2. This result suggests that irrespective of firm size, the means of b∗1 and
b1 are not the same, and b∗1−b is statistically positive. We also conduct the non-parametric Wilcoxon
signed rank tests. The z-statistics for all quintiles indicate that the p values are zero. Therefore,
this paper concludes that the medians of b∗1 and b1 are not the same either. All these results provide
evidence to suggest that b∗1 has an upward bias. As a robustness check, the two ratios r∗ and r are
also compared for each stock. The summary statistics are reported in Panel B. Again, we reach the
conclusion that r∗ tends to be larger than r.
These analyses indicate that although the trade sign Qi is most important in explaining the
price change with 92.65% of the coefficients significant at the 5% level, the other three variables
cannot be excluded. Overall, the average upward bias of 6.14 percentage points in r∗ is statistically
and economically significant.
Turning to the question of which specification has a better goodness of fit as measured by the
adjusted R2, we find that the adjusted R2all for equation (5) is on average larger than the adjusted
R2 for equation (7) by 2.87%. This larger value is statistically significant. The confidence interval
obtained in the two-tail t-test is from 2.82% to 2.92%. The null hypothesis of equal adjusted R2
value is rejected. In addition, non-parametric rank sum test supports the alternative hypothesis
of adjusted R2all being greater than adjusted R
2 for equation (7). All these results suggest that
specification (5) is empirically a better model than equation (7). Therefore, Qi alone is not sufficient
to reflect the other dimensions of informed trading.
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Conversely, one may argue that contributions from the other parameters in equation (5) should
be added to b1. But, this is not possible because, as mentioned earlier, b2 depends on the unit used
for trade size, and b3 and b4 on the unit employed to measure time. In the GH model, a unit of a
thousand shares is used. However, there is no a priori reason why a thousand shares is a suitable
aggregate unit. If the number of shares is used as the unit instead, b2 will be a thousand times
smaller because the regression is linear. As a result, the asymmetric information cost contributed
by b2 will be negligibly small compared to the transitory component C. The same argument applies
with respect to b3 and b4. This observation provides further motivation for using a unit-independent
quantity such as AIM as a measure of asymmetric information.
C. Intra-Day Analysis
An implication of the notion of relatively informed trading discussed in Section I.A is that AIM
should be higher at the beginning but lower at the end of trading day. To test this hypothesis,
NYSE’s regular trading hours are divided into seven periods and estimation statistics are obtained
for all stocks in the first three months (61 trading days) of 2003. Following Hasbrouck (1991b),
three months worth of observations of each stock are then pooled together and an AIM value is
estimated for each intra-day period.
Summary statistics for all sample stocks are presented in Table IV. On average, there are more
observations at the opening and at the closing hour. This is the well-known U-shaped regularity
of trading activity. The first half hour has the highest level of information asymmetry. On average
AIM is 20.54%. This finding is consistent with the notion that over-night information as well as
pre-opening news are processed and interpreted differently by traders. As trading progresses, more
traders become aware of the information and its interpretation, either directly or indirectly by
observing the publicly available trades and quotes in the earlier hours. As the regular trading
hours approach 4 P.M., more traders become less uninformed as news and their interpretations
are more clearly manifested in the intra-day time series of transactions. Consequently, the level of
information asymmetry drops.
When this broadly-defined information asymmetry decreases, AIM should become smaller. The
monotonic decrement is observed from Table IV, which shows a higher level of informed trading at
the beginning and lower level at the closing. The drop from the first period (9:30 A.M. to 10 A.M.)
to the second period (10 A.M. to 11 A.M.) is 2.97 percentage points. From 11 A.M. to 3 P.M., the
decrements for the four hourly periods in this time interval are 0.98, 0.29, 0.28 and 0.19 percentage
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points, respectively. Average AIM declines further by 1.18 percentage points when trading enters
the last regular hour (3 P.M. to 4 P.M), which yields the smallest average value of 14.65%. Compared
to the first half hour, the last trading hour’s AIM is 5.89 percentage points smaller, a reduction
of 28.7% in the level of information asymmetry. These results are generally consistent with the
impulse response analysis and an absolute measure (trade-correlated component of the efficient
price change) reported in Hasbrouck (1991b).
Monotonic decrements are also observed for b1 of equation (5). The values of these two pa-
rameters are larger at the beginning than at the end of trading. By contrast, C is fairly constant
throughout, although it is also lower in the last two trading hours. If one interprets 2× (C + b1) as
the implied spread, this empirical outcome is consistent with the well-documented fact that bid-ask
spreads are larger at the beginning but smaller at the end of trading day. We also note that the
average Newey-West t-statistics for b1 are large. This is consistent with our earlier findings that
trade sign is the main variable that reflects informed trading.
Similar pattern is observed for b2, the coefficient of signed volume. Compared to b1, the average
values of b2 across the intra-day time periods are more than a thousand times smaller. For example,
the average value of b1 is 1.06 cents per share in the first period while b2 is only 0.00052 cents per
share in the same period. This suggests that while b2 is statistically significant, on the per-share
basis, it is not economically significant as compared to b1.
For signed duration, we observe a U-shaped-like pattern. The 1 to 2 P.M. time slot has the
smallest average value for b3. Its value declines from morning and recovers somewhat toward the
late afternoon. A relatively long signed duration in the morning has more price impact than a long
signed duration in mid day. When trades are concentrated as in the first half hour, even a slightly
long signed duration contains relatively more information that moves the price in the direction of
the trade. Average t-statistics for b3 suggest that signed duration is significant at the 1% or 5%
level over the seven time slots. Compared to b3, the coefficient b4 of (unsigned) duration is about
ten times smaller in magnitude. But a U-shaped-like pattern for the absolute value of b4 is also
observed.
D. Daily Variation and Earnings Announcement
Another implication of broadly defined informed trading is that scheduled earnings announcements
should affect the level of information asymmetry. To the extent that public disclosures are infor-
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mative, and that traders have different interpretations, the level of information asymmetry before
an earnings announcement should be different from that after the news release. Having a daily
estimate such as AIM makes this test possible.
For each earnings announcement, six daily AIM estimates are singled out in this comparative
analysis. Two estimates are immediately before the announcement, two on the announcement day
itself and the following day, and the remaining two on the second and third trading days after the
earnings announcement date. Three periods of two days each are considered. For convenience, they
are referred to as Before, During and After.
For each announcement date, average AIM values are obtained for these three periods. For the
Before period, a ratio αb is defined as follows:
αb ≡ Average AIM for Before periodsAverage AIM for days not in Before, During and After periods. (9)
The corresponding ratios for During and After are defined in the similar fashion. They are denoted
as αd and αa, respectively. These ratios are meant to indicate the level of information asymmetry
with respect to the average AIM for other days not around any earnings announcements. Given the
sample period, the average AIM for these other days is constant for each stock in year 2003. If the
α ratio becomes larger (smaller) than one, then the level of informed trading is said to be higher
(lower) in that two-day period relative to other days.
In total, there are 4,748 quarterly earnings announcement dates in year 2003 for our sample
stocks that have analysts covering them. The median value of analysts’ forecasts for the nearest
quarter (prior to the announcement dates) is employed to indicate the consensus forecast of earn-
ings per share (EPS). If the difference between the actual EPS and the consensus EPS is positive,
then there is an upside surprise. Conversely, a downside surprise occurs when the difference is neg-
ative. When the actual EPS and the consensus EPS coincide, the quarterly firm’s report is said to
have met the analysts’ expectation. In our sample, there are 1,373 downside surprises; 811 reports
are in line with the expectation; and 2,564 earnings results beat the market.
From Panel A of Table V, one sees that before the earnings announcement, cross-sectional av-
erage αb is 1.00 with a standard deviation of 0.26. Median αb is 0.97. In other words, average AIM
for the two days in the Before period does not appear to be that different from the normal average
AIM value. Whether the earnings exceed, meet or fall short of consensus EPS does not give rise to
different αb values in the Before period.
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However, average αd and αa values of 0.95 and 0.94, respectively, are different from average
αb. These two average values for the During and After periods are generally lower, by about 5 to
6% with respect to the normal AIM level. In particular, earnings that disappoint analysts have
the largest decline. Average αa for downside surprises is 0.93 and the median is 0.90 for the After
period. It appears that after the company has released a downside surprise, the information asym-
metry gap between the informed and the uninformed generally narrows. Traders who are initially
less informed learn more from negative surprises so that their disadvantage relative to informed
traders is mitigated.
This possibility seems to be consistent with Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2003). They
find evidence that earnings and forecast are managed in such a way that non-negative surprises
occur much more frequently than what is due solely to chance. Our cross-sectional sample also
exhibits a similar pattern. Non-negative surprises are 2.46 times of negative surprises. Therefore,
it could be that non-negative surprises have become less informative. This explains why the α
ratios a day after the announcement for non-negative surprises do not decline by as much as the α
ratio for negative surprises. In other words, earnings announcements with bad news remove more
information asymmetry among traders than with good or “expected” news.
To examine whether the differences before, during and after an announcement are statistically
significant, Wilcoxon’s signed rank tests of equality of medians and two-population mean tests
are conducted. The test statistics based on 4,748 observations are tabulated in Panel B, along
with the sub-samples’ test statistics for downside surprises, in-line earnings and upside surprises.
Most of these statistics suggest that the differences are significant at the 1% level. Furthermore,
AIM becomes lower in the During period, i.e., earnings announcements are immediately useful in
reducing information asymmetry. From the During period to the After period, the declines in AIM
estimates are not as significant. But when the α ratios for Before and After periods are directly
compared, the evidence of information asymmetry reduction becomes clearer.
To see the daily changes in AIM, cross-sectional averages of α ratios are obtained for a few days
surrounding the announcement date. Figure 3 plots three curves that correspond to upside sur-
prises, expectations met and downside surprises. The decline in the α ratio is largest for earnings
that disappoints the market. On the whole, the curves slope downward three trading days before
announcement. Earnings that met and beat analysts’ consensus forecasts slope upward two days
after the announcement. For earnings that have downside surprises, the day immediately after the
announcement has the lowest AIM. Thus, a U-shape-like pattern is observed over these eight days.
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In summary, daily AIM estimates allow one to answer the question of whether earnings an-
nouncement affects the information asymmetry among traders. There is evidence to support the
hypothesis that the level of informed trading changes around the announcement date. The level is
lower during and after the public disclosure. If quarterly earnings is below analysts’ expectation,
the level declines the most — by about 7% on average.
IV. Determinants of Asymmetric Information Measure
This section examines the cross-sectional determinant of AIM. We study the relations between AIM
and variables that serve as proxies for the information channels. To make the exposition clearer,
we define for firm j,
AIMj ≡ Average of daily AIM values of firm j over the sample period . (10)
The distribution of 1,461 AIMj is plotted in Panel B of Figure 2. Average AIMj is 20.5%, which sug-
gests that this proportion of the intra-day price changes is attributable to asymmetric information.
In the beginning of this paper, we enunciate the information structure of a firm as channels
through which information about the firm is revealed to the market, which is reflected in the stock
price. The number of traders in this channel determines the channel capacity in revealing the
information. Viewed from the perspective of information structure, it is natural to reckon that
analysts constitute another channel for the information flow. The bandwidth of this channel is
determined by the number of analysts.
At any given time, the stock price represents a consensus valuation by traders. It follows that
the equity option market provides yet another channel, as the option price and the stock price are
related. Therefore, we consider the following variables that characterize the information structure
of firm j:
• Shareholdersj : Number of firm j’s shareholders in logarithmic levels13;
• Analystsj : Number of analysts following firm j in logarithmic levels;
• Optionj : An indicator variable that equals one if the stock of firm j is an underlying instru-
ment of some options traded in some option exchanges, and zero otherwise.
13The logarithmic scale is used because the number of shareholders varies over a few orders of magnitude in our
sample.
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The number of shareholders is used as a proxy for the number of traders in the stock market. In
general, a larger number of shareholders is likely to correlate with a greater degree of heterogeneity
in traders’ valuations. A larger base of investors with greater heterogeneity tends to associate with
a lower level of information asymmetry, and vice versa. Regression A in Table VI provides a test
for this heterogeneity hypothesis. The tabulated t-statistics in the parentheses are adjusted with
Newey and West (1987)’s algorithm to account for potential heteroskedasticity and inter-stock cor-
relations. As anticipated, we find that AIMj relates negatively to Shareholdersj with a coefficient
of -1.06.
Next, we consider the information channel characterized by Analystsj . It is reasonable to as-
sume that analysts’ reports are informative in general. Their reports and forecasts at least raise
the public awareness of the firms they are following. Consequently, investors may become more
receptive to trade the stocks of these firms. More analysts tend to narrow the information gap
between the informed and the uninformed. The level of information asymmetry should be lower
when there are more analysts providing their assessments and recommendations. Regression B
in Table VI tests the relation between AIMj and Analystsj . We obtain a t-statistic of -27.6, which
implies that their relation is negative and statistically significant.
We find that Analystsj is more powerful in explaining the cross-sectional variation in AIMj .
The goodness of fit for Regression B is more than 45%. In contrast, Shareholdersj in Regression A
explains only 11.5%. This could be attributable to the possibility that Shareholdersj is a noisy
proxy for the number of traders.
The existence of an option market with the stock as the underlying instrument provides an
alternative channel for information flow. Traders who are confident about their valuation may find
options attractive owing to the leverage they provide. These informed traders may choose to make
a profit not from the stock market but from the option market instead. Chakravarty, Gulen, and
Mayhew (2004) employ a vector error correction model to measure the intra-day price discovery in
option markets. Their evidence supports the notion that informed investors trade options to take
advantage of high leverage. Moreover, they hypothesize that hedging demand by option writers
may represent an indirect type of informed trading for the underlying stocks. By having Optionj as
a control variable, our empirical study provides a test for the net effect of option market. If option
markets draw informed traders away from the stock market is the primary effect, and if hedging by
option market makers is a secondary effect, then one would expect Optionj to be negatively related
to AIMj . Conversely, if hedging the underlying stocks by option market makers is the primary
effect on the stock market, then Optionj will be positively related to AIMj .
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In Regressions C and D, the indicator variable Optionj is included in the specification. Consis-
tent with the hypothesis that informed traders may choose to take advantage on the equity option
market instead, we find that AIMj is negatively related to Optionj . The double-digit t-statistics for
Optionj in these two regressions strongly suggest that a stock that attracts option writers and op-
tion traders have a smaller amount of information asymmetry on the stock market. The reduction
in AIMj due to fewer traders being asymmetrically informed on the stock market outweighs the
hedging demand of option market makers.
It is noteworthy that when Optionj is included, the loadings on Shareholdersj and on Analystsj
are reduced. The coefficient for Shareholdersj is -0.55 in Regression C as compared to -1.06 in
Regression A. Similarly, the coefficient for Analystsj changes from -4.32 to -2.80 when Optionj is
included. We perform Regression E to further examine the relative effectiveness of the three vari-
ables, Shareholdersj , Analystsj and Optionj in explaining cross-sectional AIMj . All the coefficients
for the three information channel variables are found to be negatively significant.
Finally, we regress AIMj on these three information channel variables along with Capj (the mar-
ket capitalization) and B/Mj (the book-to-market ratio) in logarithmic levels as control variables.
The result is as follows:
AIMj = 30.1− 0.166Shareholdersj − 2.383Analystsj − 5.026Optionj − 0.357Capj − 0.501B/Mj .
(23.6) (−2.46) (−11.1) (−13.1) (−2.81) (−2.89)
(11)
The t-statistics are shown in the parentheses. The adjusted R2 of this regression is 58.0%, which
is marginally better than 57.1% of Regression E. More importantly, Shareholdersj is significant
at the 5% level, while Analystsj and Optionj are consistently significant at the 1% level for this
specification, and for all the regressions reported in Table VI. Therefore, we have evidence to
suggest that more traders and analysts following the firm help to reduce information asymmetry,
and the option market diverts informed traders from the primary information channel, the stock
market. This diversion effect more than offsets the asymmetric information conveyed indirectly by
option market makers back to the stock market in their hedging trades.
As anticipated, larger firms do not have as much asymmetric information among traders as
smaller firms. We find that higher book-to-market or value firms have a smaller proportion of
informed trading. Overall, the more robust relation is with the number of analysts and whether
there are exchange-traded equity options on firms shares.
22
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks
An understanding of informed trading has implications for financial market regulators, institu-
tional traders and investors at large. In addition, the design of information structure is important
in making corporate decisions on how material information should be managed. Since a firm with
higher asymmetric information costs tends to have higher capital costs, a market microstructure
analysis of informed trading is potentially useful for corporate finance.
We show that existing models of asymmetric information need to control for other variables
that are also deemed to reflect informed trading. These models are inconsistent with each other
with regard to either the trade size or the trade sign as the variable that captures asymmetric
information. This paper jointly examines four variables predicated to reflect informed trading.
These variables are trade sign, signed volume, as well as duration and signed duration. Overall,
the results indicate that trade sign reflects information asymmetry better than the other three
variables.
We quantify the explanatory power of these four determinants of intra-day stock price change.
On average, they jointly explain 19.7% of the variation that is attributable to information asymme-
try for the NYSE stocks. This paper also provides a more generic framework to interpret informed
trading. In our framework, not only are the insiders informed, small investors who can arrive
at reliable conclusions concerning the fundamental values of firms are also deemed to be better
informed than noise traders. There is information asymmetry even when the trades are not moti-
vated by private information. Transactions per se are informative as well. Our empirical results
show that trades after a long duration tend to move stock price in the direction of their trade signs.
Using the proposed asymmetric information measure, we study changes in the level of informed
trading around public disclosures of quarterly earnings. A total of 4,748 announcement dates are
separated into three groups of upside, downside and no surprises. This paper finds evidence in
support of a normal to slightly higher level of informed trading two to three days prior to the
announcement. The level decreases monotonically until one to two days after the announcement.
Moreover, the decrement is more dramatic for earnings that disappoints analysts’ expectation.
As expected, the proposed asymmetric information measure indicates that the level of informed
trading is highest during the market open. It decreases monotonically well into the afternoon and
the level is the lowest an hour before the closing bell. This result is consistent with the notion that
traders learn from past trades in the earlier hours about the stock value. As a result, information
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asymmetry becomes less pronounced toward the later trading hours of the day. An implication of
this finding is that uninformed liquidity traders have a tendency to trade toward the end of NYSE’s
regular hours. This result is consistent with Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).
Finally, the empirical findings with a subsample of 1,207 NYSE common stocks in year 2003
support the hypotheses that analysts and equity option markets are helpful in reducing the infor-
mation asymmetry among traders in the stock market. Specifically, after controlling for firm size
and book-to-market value, we find that the asymmetric information measure relates negatively to
the number of analysts following a firm. This measure will also be lower if there are exchange-
traded options with the firm’s common stock as the underlying instrument. These results have
practical implications for firms’ managers. To improve the information structure, our findings sug-
gest that it is worthwhile to consider ways to attract not only more investors and analysts but also
option writers.
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Table I
Annual Statistics for 1,461 NYSE Firms
Panel A tabulates the number of common shares outstanding, market price and capitalization as at
end of December 2002. These statistics are obtained from CRISP. From Compustat, annual book val-
ues are extracted to arrive at the book-to-market ratios. The number of shareholders is also from
Compustat whereas the number of analysts is derived from I/B/E/S for stocks that have at least one
analyst following the firm. Not all our sample firms had transactions on each of the 252 trad-
ing days in year 2003. Firms in the first percentile had only 55.1 days. Annual statistics for
the trading activity are based on TAQ. We report seller-initiated transactions in negative numbers.
Panel B tabulates the correlation coefficients. All the correlation coefficients are significant at the 5%
level except the correlation between the book-to-market ratio and the number of shareholders.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Unit Mean Standard Percentile
Deviation 1st 25th 50th 75th 99th
Common Shares Billions 0.19 0.53 0.005 0.03 0.05 0.14 2.37
Price $ 23.86 25.53 1.269 10.81 20.62 31.89 77.45
Capitalization Billion $ 5.29 17.66 0.026 0.35 1.03 3.16 83.34
Book-to-Market ×103 0.74 0.71 0.055 0.37 0.59 0.86 3.57
Number of Shareholders Thousands 36.30 162.21 0.045 1.24 4.67 17.50 667.47
Number of Analysts 11.17 7.94 1 5 10 16 34
Days of Trading 244.1 33.0 55.1 251 252 252 252
Number of Thousands 105.5 109.4 0.488 25.89 69.30 154.22 505.8
Trades -87.8 -94.3 -0.415 -20.71 -56.11 -124.94 -440.3
Volume Millions 1.06 2.09 0.004 0.11 0.36 1.13 10.01
Traded -0.77 -1.57 -0.003 -0.09 -0.26 -0.80 -7.46
Dollar Volume Million $ 30.4 63.5 0.015 1.73 7.74 29.98 314.1
Traded -22.2 -47.7 -0.014 -1.36 -5.60 -21.68 -236.1
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients
Capitalization Book-to-Market Shareholders Analysts
Capitalization 1 -0.152 0.370 0.388
Book-to-Market 1 -0.032 -0.252
Shareholders 1 0.277
Analysts 1
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Table II
Relative Importance of Variables that Capture Asymmetric Information
This table reports the summary statistics for the coefficients of the following regression:
∆Pi = b0 + C∆Qi + b1Qi + b2Xi + b3Qi∆Ti + b4∆Ti + i .
The dependent variable is the trade-to-trade price change. The explanatory variables of interest are trade
sign Qi, signed volume Xi, signed duration Qi∆Ti and duration ∆Ti. In total, 329,187 GMM regressions
have been performed. In Panels A and B, the percentage is computed with this number as the denominator.
Panel C uses the numbers in Panel B to arrive at the percentages of positive estimates that are significant
at the 1% level.
Panel A: 5% Significance Level
b1 b2 b3 b4
Number 304,989 143,759 107,362 49,156
Percent 92.65 43.67 32.61 14.93
Panel B: 1% Significance Level
b1 b2 b3 b4
Number 287,475 89,958 63,376 18,996
Percent 87.33 27.33 19.25 5.77
Panel C: Positive Estimates (1% Level)
b1 b2 b3 b4
Number 287,424 87,714 59,174 7,188
Percent 99.98 97.51 93.37 37.84
28
Table III
Summary Statistics for Comparing the Trade Sign’s Parameter Estimates
This table reports the summary statistics for the parameter estimates in the following two specifi-
cations:
∆Pi = a0 + C∗∆Qi + b∗1Qi + 
∗
i ;
∆Pi = b0 + C∆Qi + b1Qi + b2Xi + b3Qi∆Ti + b4∆Ti + i .
In these two specifications, ∆Pi is the trade-to-trade price change, Qi the trade sign, Xi the signed
volume and ∆Ti the trade duration. Residuals are denoted by ∗i and i, respectively. Quantities
of interest are b∗1 in the first specification, and the corresponding construct b1 in the second spec-
ification. The second specification provides a platform to examine the bias in b∗1 when the three
variables Xi, Qi∆Ti and ∆Ti are omitted. For each sample stock that has at least 50 paired sets of
estimates, a two-tail t-test for the null hypothesis of equal mean value (b∗1 = b1) is performed. An-
other t-test is also performed to examine the null hypothesis of r∗ = r. These two ratios are defined
by b∗1/(b∗1 + C∗) and b1/(b1 + C), respectively. To present the statistics, the stocks are grouped into
quintiles by market capitalization. The first quintile contains 293 smallest market capitalization
stocks. For the other four quintiles, each has 292 stocks. The percentile (per) statistics for the val-
ues of b∗1, b1 and the t-test statistics are reported in Panel A. As an example, for stocks in the first
market capitalization quintile, the first-percentile value for their b∗1 estimates is 0.117 cents per
share and the 99-th percentile value is 3.85 cents per share. The b1 estimates are 0.038 cents per
share in the first percentile and 3.291 cents per share in the 99-th percentile. Their two-population
mean tests’ t-statistics at the first percentile is 2.19 and 10.42 at the 99-th percentile. The corre-
sponding statistics for r∗, r and the test statistics are reported in Panel B. Overall, the large values
of t-statistics in all quintiles provide evidence that irrespective of firm size, b∗1 has an upward bias
relative to b1.
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Panel A
First Quintile: Smallest Market Capitalization Stocks
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
b∗1 (in Cents/Share) 0.117 0.540 0.863 1.334 3.850
b1 (in Cents/Share) 0.038 0.367 0.632 1.034 3.291
t-statistic 2.19 3.85 5.00 6.17 10.42
Second Quintile
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
b∗1 (in Cents/Share) 0.139 0.517 0.819 1.261 3.509
b1 (in Cents/Share) 0.073 0.376 0.615 0.968 2.865
t-statistic 2.97 5.18 6.26 7.60 11.72
Third Quintile
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
b∗1 (in Cents/Share) 0.110 0.415 0.659 1.018 3.006
b1 (in Cents/Share) 0.068 0.311 0.501 0.785 2.395
t-statistic 2.51 5.83 6.98 8.42 16.03
Fourth Quintile
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
b∗1 (in Cents/Share) 0.121 0.361 0.529 0.750 1.936
b1 (in Cents/Share) 0.079 0.270 0.406 0.585 1.534
t-statistic 3.52 6.58 8.13 9.84 14.58
Fifth Quintile: Largest Market Capitalization Stocks
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
b∗1 (in Cents/Share) 0.106 0.308 0.441 0.628 1.465
b1 (in Cents/Share) 0.058 0.224 0.328 0.472 1.134
t-statistic 4.21 8.29 10.52 12.38 24.71
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Panel B
First Quintile: Smallest Market Capitalization Stocks
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
r∗ (in %) 17.00 45.85 58.04 70.37 95.56
r (in %) 5.92 37.57 51.15 65.30 94.44
t-statistic 2.14 3.27 3.96 4.96 7.98
Second Quintile
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
r∗ (in %) 21.04 47.78 59.08 70.28 94.62
r (in %) 11.18 40.47 52.84 65.34 93.50
t-statistic 2.57 3.97 4.72 5.54 8.95
Third Quintile
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
r∗ (in %) 18.64 44.67 55.67 66.32 90.58
r (in %) 11.92 38.04 49.63 61.13 88.93
t-statistic 2.60 4.64 5.40 6.42 12.82
Fourth Quintile
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
r∗ (in %) 20.45 42.10 51.11 59.81 81.61
r (in %) 14.03 35.58 45.11 54.32 78.03
t-statistic 3.44 5.66 7.05 8.18 12.86
Fifth Quintile: Largest Market Capitalization Stocks
1st per 25th per 50th per 75th per 99th per
r∗ (in %) 18.68 39.38 47.42 55.20 74.82
r (in %) 10.97 32.14 40.38 48.58 70.56
t-statistic 4.43 7.71 9.70 11.83 24.22
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Table IV
Summary Statistics for Intra-Day Parameter and AIM Estimates
This table reports the parameter estimates’ mean and standard deviation (std) for our 1,461 NYSE
sample stocks. The regular hours are delineated into seven intra-day periods. For the first quarter
in year 2003, observations of each stock are pooled according to these intra-day periods. The total
number of observations for each time slot isN . Cross-sectional statistics are obtained and presented
period by period. The coefficient of change in trade sign ∆Qi is denoted by C; trade sign Qi by b1,
signed volumeXi by b2, signed durationQi∆Ti by b3 and duration∆Ti by b4 in the following equation
for transaction price change ∆Pi:
∆Pi = b0 + C∆Qi + b1Qi + b2Xi + b3Qi∆Ti + b4∆Ti + i .
R2asy is the asymmetric informationmeasure (AIM) obtained from theR2 value of the above equation
and that of ∆Pi = c0 + c1∆Qi + ui.
9:30 A.M. 10 A.M. 11 A.M. 12 P.M. 1 P.M. 2 P.M. 3 P.M.
to to to to to to to
Unit 10 A.M. 11 A.M. 12 P.M. 1 P.M. 2 P.M. 3 P.M. 4 P.M.
N (mean) Number 3,759 8,089 6,515 5,642 5,650 6,819 8,938
N (std) Number 4,121 8,436 7,160 6,320 6,244 7,249 8,636
C (mean) Cents/Share 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.56
C (std) Cents/Share 0.33 0.33 0.46 0.56 0.48 0.55 0.37
t-statistic (mean) 18.8 30.0 29.5 28.4 28.9 31.6 34.0
b1 (mean) Cents/Share 1.06 0.86 0.77 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.64
b1 (std) Cents/Share 1.87 1.67 1.28 1.27 1.77 1.44 1.31
t-statistic (mean) 11.5 16.8 15.4 14.3 14.2 15.3 16.0
b2 × 103 (mean) Cents/Share 0.52 0.22 0.26 0.34 0.26 0.24 0.21
b2 × 103 (std) Cents/Share 2.94 1.44 0.75 3.02 1.09 0.75 0.60
t-statistic (mean) 2.50 2.97 2.96 3.32 2.92 2.99 3.57
b3 × 103 (mean) Cents/Second 7.10 4.14 2.04 1.30 1.18 1.59 2.02
b3 × 103 (std) Cents/Second 11.55 7.92 4.29 2.85 2.68 3.52 4.80
t-statistic (mean) 3.91 4.33 2.86 2.16 2.02 2.42 2.47
b4 × 103 (mean) Cents/Second -0.25 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.15 -0.13
b4 × 103 (std) Cents/Second 2.01 1.07 0.75 0.59 0.60 0.69 0.84
t-statistic (mean) -0.31 -0.56 -0.45 -0.41 -0.44 -0.56 -0.48
R2asy (mean) % 20.54 17.57 16.59 16.30 16.02 15.83 14.65
R2asy (std) % 6.97 5.52 5.26 5.67 5.50 5.12 4.55
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Table V
Summary and Test Statistics for Daily AIM around Earnings Announcements
Panel A reports the statistics for ratios of average AIM estimates around earnings announcement
dates over normal levels of informed trading, which are the average AIM estimates for other days.
A ratio smaller (larger) than one is indicative that AIM is lower (higher) than the normal level.
Three periods of two days each are considered: before, during and after an earnings announce-
ment. Two days during an announcement are the announcement date itself and the following day.
The three periods are non-overlapping. Median, mean and standard deviation (Std) statistics for
4,748 announcement dates in year 2003 for our NYSE sample are reported. Respectively, Upside
and Downside refer to the positive and negative differences between actual earnings per share and
analysts’ consensus, while Met denotes that the actual earnings met analysts’ expectation. The
numbers of subsample observations for downside and upside surprises are 1,373 and 2,564, respec-
tively. The remaining 811 quarterly earnings are in line with analysts’ forecasts. Panel B reports
the Wilcoxon signed rank tests’ z-statistics (z-stat) and the two-population mean tests’ t-statistics
(t-stat). These tests are designed to ascertain whether the ratios are the same from one period to
the other.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Ratios
Two Days Before Two Days During Two Days After
All Downside Met Upside All Downside Met Upside All Downside Met Upside
Median 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.92
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94
Std 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24
Panel B: Test Statistics for Null Hypotheses of Same Ratios Across Periods
During − Before After − During After − Before
All Downside Met Upside All Downside Met Upside All Downside Met Upside
z-stat -10.92 -6.73 -4.63 -7.29 -3.09 -1.48 -1.72 -2.12 -13.68 -8.05 -6.12 -9.27
t-stat -9.93 -6.98 -4.66 -5.75 -2.43 -0.46 -1.01 -2.41 -12.20 -7.12 -5.28 -8.38
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Table VI
AIM of a Firm and Information Structure
This table reports the summary statistics for five cross-sectional regressions labeled as A, B, C, D and E.
The dependent variable is the asymmetric information measure (AIMj) for a firm in year 2003. The number
of sample stocks is not the same for these five regressions. This is because not all the firms in our sample
have a record for the number of shareholders (Shareholders) in Compustat, and for the number of analysts
following the firm (Analysts) in I/B/E/S. Information concerning the indicator variable Option is obtained
from the Options Clearing Corporation. The t-statistics are shown in the parentheses. The adjusted R2
values in this table indicate the goodness of fit for these five regressions.
Regression Intercept Shareholders Analysts Option Number of stocks AdjustedR2
A 21.9 -1.06 1,275 11.5%
(-96.1) (-13.7)
B 28.9 -4.32 1,279 45.2%
(74.2) (-27.6)
C 27.3 -0.55 -8.68 1,275 48.7%
(79.0) (-8.65) (-22.0)
D 29.5 -2.80 -5.24 1,279 56.2%
(84.1) (-16.1) (-14.5)
E 29.4 -0.28 -2.59 -5.08 1,207 57.1%
(81.2) (-4.80) (-14.4) (-14.0)
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Figure 1. Time Series of Cross-Sectional Daily Average Values.
This figure plots the cross-sectional average value of AIM on a daily basis. This asymmetric infor-
mation measure is the joint contribution of four variables in equation (5) in explaining intra-day
price changes. These four variables are trade sign, signed volume, signed duration and duration.
On each trading day in our sample period of year 2003, we estimate AIM for each sample stock.
The daily average is taken cross-sectionally and plotted as time series.
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Figure 2. Distributions of Asymmetric Information Estimates.
This figure plots the histograms for the estimates of asymmetric information from high-frequency
data. The asymmetric information measure is the joint contribution of four variables in equation (5)
in explaining intra-day price changes. These four variables are trade sign, signed volume, signed
duration and duration. Our sample comprises 1,461 NYSE common stocks and our sample period
is year 2003 (252 trading days). In total, we have 329,187 stock-days. Panel A shows the histogram
for this number of daily estimates. Panel B displays the histogram of 1,461 values averaged over
the sample period.
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Panel B: Daily Estimates Averaged Over the Sample Period
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Mean: 20.5%             
Standard Deviation: 6.4%
Minimum: 1.86%          
Maximum: 50.9%          
Skewness: 1.2           
Kurtosis: 4.3           
 Average Asymmetric Information Measure (in %)
N
um
be
r
37
Figure 3. Earnings Surprises and Informed Trading
This figure plots three curves of average α ratios for our NYSE sample stocks that have analysts
following. The horizontal axis is the day number with Day 0 being the earnings announcement
date. The α ratio measures the level of informed trading relative to the normal level, which is the
average AIM value for days not surrounding the earnings releases in year 2003. The normal level
is a constant for a given stock. If AIM values for days near the announcement date is higher (lower)
than the normal level, then the α ratio is larger (smaller) than one.
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